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This review examines cross-cultural differences in interoception and the role of culturally
bound epistemologies, historical traditions, and contemplative practices to assess four
aspects of culture and interoception: (1) the extent to which members from Western
and non-Western cultural groups exhibit differential levels of interoceptive accuracy and
somatic awareness; (2) the mechanistic origins that can explain these cultural differences,
(3) culturally bound behavioral practices that have been empirically shown to affect
interoception, and (4) consequences for culturally bound psychopathologies.The following
outlines the scope of the scientiﬁc review. Part 1 reviews studies on cultural variation
in spontaneous somatic word use, linguistic expressions, traditional medical practices,
and empirical laboratory studies to assess the evidence for cultural differences in somatic
processes. Integration of these ﬁndings suggests a startling paradox: on the one hand, non-
Western cultures consistently exhibit heightened somatic focus and awareness across a
variety of contexts; on the other hand, non-Western cultures also exhibit less interoceptive
accuracy in laboratory studies. Part 2 discusses the various mechanistic explanations
that have been proposed to explain these cultural differences in somatic awareness
and interoceptive accuracy, focusing on cultural schemas and epistemologies. Part 3
addresses the behavioral and contemplative practices that have been proposed as possible
“interventions,” or methods of cultivating bodily awareness and perceptual accuracy.
Finally, Part 4 reviews the consequences of interoception for psychopathology, including
somatization, body dysmorphia, eating disorders, and anxiety disorders.
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How does culture shape interoception? A growing body of psy-
chological research has compellingly demonstrated that humans
are a uniquely cultural species insofar as the extent to which
we are able to learn from our social groups and the extent to
which such learning can radically change a broad spectrum of our
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Tomasello, 1999; Richerson and
Boyd, 2005; Heine and Norenzayan, 2006). As a result of these
advances, many of the most foundational psychological processes
previously assumed to be universal have been shown to be pro-
foundly culturally bound (for review, see Heine and Norenzayan,
2006).
Although this notion that culture shapes ourmost basic features
of our psyche has been applied to a host of processes, there has
been few attempts to systematically understandhowcultural forces
shape awareness of the body. Thus, the purpose of this review is
to elucidate the role of culturally bound epistemologies, historical
traditions, and contemplative practices in shaping somatic aware-
ness and interoceptive accuracy. Given the multitude of ways that
a process as complex as interoception and culture can be stud-
ied, the approach herewill be interdisciplinary—bringing together
evidence from anthropology, clinical science, and psychology.
Speciﬁcally, the review will focus on four key features of cul-
ture and interoception. First, I will review both empirical and
ethnographic evidence that examines the extent towhichmembers
from Western and non-Western cultural groups exhibit differen-
tial levels of somatic awareness and interoceptive accuracy (Part
1). From there, I will discuss the proposed mechanistic origins that
can explain these cultural differences (Part 2). I will then review
culturally bound behavioral practices that have been empirically
shown to affect interception (Part 3), and end with a discussion
for how culturally bound interoception many have consequences
for culturally bound psychopathologies (Part 4).
PART 1: CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN SOMATIC
AWARENESS AND INTEROCEPTIVE ACCURACY
As with virtually all scientiﬁc inquiry, the ﬁrst step to understand-
ing a complex phenomena is to predict and discover interesting
features of the process at hand (see Cronbach, 1986; Rozin, 2001,
for review). In the context of cultural processes and interocep-
tion, this ﬁrst stage involves identifying key cultural differences in
the way individuals perceive and understand their own bodies. To
what extent do people from different cultural backgrounds vary in
their somatic awareness and interoceptive accuracy?
The question of how cultures differ in somatic awareness and
interoceptive accuracy is a challenge because the twoprocess, albeit
related,may not align insofar aswhether or not cultural differences
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in the one also entails (the same) cultural differences in the other.
Somatic or interoceptive awareness centers on the extent to which
individuals ﬁndbodily cues salient,whereas interoceptive accuracy
centers on individuals’ abilities to accurately infer the cause and
magnitude of their bodily changes. While interoceptive awareness
is typically operationalized as the frequency of reporting bodily
sensation and beliefs about the importance of such bodily states,
interoceptive accuracy is typically operationalized as the degree of
precision in reporting actual bodily states (e.g., heart rate). This
distinction is also reﬂected on the neural level, as somatic aware-
ness and interoceptive accuracy rely ondifferent brainmechanisms
(Critchley et al., 2004). Somatic awareness stands as a ﬁrmly top–
down process that is driven by attention, beliefs and expectations
(Rimé et al., 1990; Philippot and Rimé, 1997). In contrast, inte-
roceptive accuracy depends on both bottom–up processes (e.g.,
the detection of bodily cues and the presence of physiological fea-
tures that facilitate such detection, such as ﬁtness level—Jones
et al., 1987), as well as top–down ones (e.g., attention, cultural
schemas—Pennebaker and Hoover, 1984; Van den Bergh et al.,
1998; Wiens, 2005). Thus, the former does not serve as simply
a proxy for the latter. Indeed, outside the cultural literature, a
number of studies have found that awareness and accuracy can be
dissociated (Pennebaker and Hoover, 1984; Gardner et al., 1990;
Pennebaker, 1995; Critchley et al., 2004), or even inversely related
(Fairclough and Goodwin, 2007). Given their qualitative differ-
ences, evidence for cultural differences in each process will be
reviewed separately, and their implications will subsequently be
discussed.
These challenges in disentangling somatic awareness from inte-
roceptive accuracy are further complicated by the fact that somatic
awareness is, in itself, a multi-faceted construct that have been
construed in different ways across different disciplines (for review,
see Mehling et al., 2012). On the one hand, somatic awareness
can be deﬁned by the outcome achieved by focusing direct atten-
tion on in-the-moment bodily changes and affective responses;
training aimed at increasing this type of awareness (e.g., con-
crete somatic monitoring; sensory discrimination) suggests that
it can be adaptive (Flor et al., 2001; Watkins and Moulds, 2005).
In contrast, ruminating on the body for the purpose of vigilance
appears to be a less adaptive form of somatic awareness (Ciofﬁ,
1991; Ciofﬁ and Holloway, 1993; Watkins and Moulds, 2005).
Additionally, a further distinction can be made between proprio-
ceptive versus interoceptive awareness. While the former centers
on perception of muscles, joints,movements, posture, and balance
(Laskowski, 2000), the later centers on perception of internal bod-
ily sensation—including, but not limited to: heart rate, breathing,
and hunger (Vaitl, 1996; Cameron, 2001; Craig, 2002; Barrett et al.,
2004).
Given this multi-dimensional nature of somatic awareness,
it is difﬁcult to draw conclusive inferences about the nature of
cross-cultural variation in how people perceive bodily states. Nev-
ertheless, convergent evidence from both empirical studies and
ethnographic work is suggestive that members of a number of
non-Western cultures may exhibit higher levels of somatic aware-
ness than members of Western cultures. In their seminal work
on culture, emotion, and language, Tsai et al. (2004) found that
Chinese–Americans respondents consistently used more somatic
words than European–Americans when discussing a variety of
events, including their relationships, early childhood experiences,
and conversations with their romantic partners; furthermore,
even among Chinese–Americans, those who were less accultur-
ated to North-American culture exhibited this greater reliance
on somatic words relative to those who were more accultur-
ated. This ﬁnding is consistent with a broad body of work that
has suggested that Chinese culture perceives bodily and psycho-
logical states to be closely intertwined (Kleinman, 1986; Ots,
1990). Likewise, close examination of the ﬁndings on culture
and the self from Kanagawa et al. (2001) study on spontaneous
self-description among college students highlights the dispro-
portionately higher use of somatic descriptors among Japanese
compared to NorthAmericans. Taken together, these ﬁndings sug-
gest that East-Asians appear to demonstrate a greater emphasis on
their bodily states when describing themselves and their emotional
experiences.
Additional evidence from linguistics suggests that this greater
emphasis on somatic cues in everyday life among East-Asians may
be traced back to historic traditions steeped within Asian lan-
guage and medicine. In the Chinese language, for example, many
idiomatic emotional expressions use the body parts (speciﬁcally,
visceral organs) as metaphors: xuan-xin diao dan (to have one’s
heart in one’s mouth), ti xin diao dan (lift the heart, hang the gall-
bladder), dan-zhan xin jib (gall trembling, heart startled), dan-po
xin jin (gall breaking, heart startled), jing-xin diao-dan (shock the
heart, drop the gallbladder), xin-dan ju lie (heart and gallbladder,
both split), all refer to states of fear, where the heart and the gall-
bladder are described as lifted, hanging in the air, jolted, broken,
dropped, or torn. We ﬁnd the same pattern of somatic focus in
Chinese holistic medicine, which model the body as a powerful
psychological force. According to traditional holistic models of
the human body, decision-making and thought reside primarily
not in the mind, but in the liver, the site of contemplation; the
gallbladder, the place where judgments are made; and the heart,
the executive center (Ye, 2002).
Similar cultural patterns also emerge in other East-Asian cul-
tures. In Japanese, anger starts off by being contained the belly
(hara), then progresses to the chest (mune), and ﬁnally reaches
the head (atama; Matsuki, 1995). Given that cultural ideas and
language have long been argued to be inseparable—after all,
language stands as the primary mechanism for transmitting cul-
tural ideas (Wierzbicka, 1993, 1995; Tomasello, 1999; Slobin,
2003)—these provide convergent evidence of cross-cultural vari-
ation in the degree to which individuals emphasize somatic
experiences.
East-Asians cultures are not the only non-Western cultural
groups that exhibit this pattern. A growing number of recent
studies has found that many cultural groups, including those
from Papua New Guinea (Lindström, 2002), aboriginal Australia
(Turpin, 2002), and West Africa (Geurts, 2003) display a similar
emphasis on the body. In the West African case, anthropolo-
gists have observed that cultural terms exist that refer exclusively
to bodily sensations for which there is no English translation
(e.g., “seselelame,” which can be roughly translated as “feel-feel-
inside-the-body”—Geurts, 2003). Likewise, many West-African
languages use the body as a basis for their emotional terms
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(Ameka, 2001; Dzokoto and Okazaki, 2006), much like the way
they are used in Chinese and Japanese. Likewise, African tradi-
tional medicine also focuses on harmony and holism, treating
the body and mind as fundamentally integrated rather than
separate (Mbiti, 1970). In line with these cultural practices, it
is not surprising that recent research by Dzokoto (2010) and
Chentsova-Dutton and Dzokoto (2014) found that West-Africans
also self-reported greater sensitivity to bodily changes relative to
European–Americans.
Taken together, these ﬁndings offer suggestive—but not
deﬁnitive—evidence for cultural variation in somatic awareness.
At best, the majority of the aforementioned work has yielded
indirect evidence for a greater cultural emphasis on bodily parts
and processes among members of non-Western cultural groups—
namely, East-Asians and West-Africans. Given the indirect nature
of this evidence, it remains unclear the precise nature and form of
these cross-cultural differences, and whether they extend to pro-
prioception or interoception, mindful awareness of bodily states
or vigilant monitoring of bodily cues.
These limitations notwithstanding, to what extent does this
potential cultural difference in somatic awareness translate into
interoceptive accuracy? As a construct, interoceptive accu-
racy stands as a crucial feature of numerous emotion theories
(e.g., James, 1884; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Damasio, 1994)
with a wide range of consequences for a variety of psycho-
logical processes, including self-regulation (e.g., Barrett et al.,
2004), decision-making (e.g., Werner et al., 2009) and atten-
tion (e.g., Matthias et al., 2009). Although the majority of
studies to date on interoceptive accuracy have focused on indi-
viduals’ abilities to accurately detect cardiac signals given its
non-invasive nature, more recent ﬁndings suggest that cardiac
accuracy predicts other forms of accuracy—namely, sensitiv-
ity for gastric functions, and thus may reliably stand as a
more general indicator of interoceptive accuracy (Herbert et al.,
2012b). Furthermore, a number of individual differences, situa-
tional forces and practices can inﬂuence interoceptive accuracy,
including: food deprivation (e.g., Herbert et al., 2011), gender
(e.g., Koch and Pollatos, 2014a); obesity (e.g., Herbert and Pol-
latos, 2014), and disordered eating (e.g., Koch and Pollatos,
2014b).
A striking paradox emerges in the literature on culture, somatic
awareness, and interoceptive accuracy. Until now, few studies have
dealt speciﬁcallywith the relationshipbetween culture and internal
bodily states. The bulk of the existing literature has focused exclu-
sively on actual (rather than perceived) bodily changes and has
found few, if any, cultural differences (Tsai et al., 2002; Soto et al.,
2005). Thus, it appears that there is little evidence for consistent
cross-cultural variation in actual bodily events.
Nevertheless, recent work by Ma-Kellams et al. (2012) found
that when it comes to perceiving bodily changes, East-Asians are
less accurate than European–Americans. Across four studies, East-
Asians consistently demonstrated less interoceptive accuracy: they
were more likely to misattribute the cause of their bodily changes
and displayed greater discrepancies between their perceived and
actual bodily states (in this case, heart rate).
Chentsova-Dutton andDzokoto (2014) found a similar pattern
of results with West-Africans. Despite the fact that West-Africans
reported higher levels of interoceptive awareness, they nevertheless
displayed less interoceptive accuracy—as in the previous case,
they were less able to accurately report their heart rate relative
to European–Americans. Taken together, these two studies offer
limited and tentative evidence for an interesting paradox: both
East-Asians and West-Africans are simultaneously more aware of
their own bodies (“aware” insofar as they ﬁnd bodily features more
salient in everyday life and report higher levels of somatic sensi-
tivity), and yet they display a relative inability to accurately infer
bodily changes. How can this be?
PART 2: EXPLAINING CROSS-CULTURAL VARIATION IN
SOMATIC AWARENESS AND INTEROCEPTIVE ACCURACY
Part 1 of this review, in identifying the key differences in
somatic focus and interoceptive accuracy between Western and
non-Western cultural groups, highlighted an important puz-
zle: members of East-Asian and West-African cultures appear
to be both more somatically focused and more inaccurate in
their somatic inferences. This raises the deeper issue of how the
previously observed cultural differences in interoception can by
explained. In the following sections, I articulate the divergent pro-
posed explanations for these cultural differences in somatic focus
and interoceptive accuracy.
Given that culture, at its core, consists of collectively shared
meaning systems that involve beliefs, values, language, and rituals
that serve to both produce behavior in culturally consistent way
and reinforce such behavior (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952), it
is not surprisingly that the long-standing explanation put forth
for why cultures vary in the degree of somatic focus is differ-
ences in these culturally speciﬁc meaning systems. However, there
lacks a consensus as to which feature of culture is the critical
one that can explain differences in bodily focus. Some scholars
argue that differences in cultural conceptualizations of the body
and how it relates to other key features of the self is the pri-
mary process at hand; namely, Eastern cultural models of the self
and emotion portray the body as fundamentally entwined with
the body (Kleinman, 1986; Ots, 1990). Other scholars, in con-
trast, contend that differences in language is the critical driving
force, and that for members of a Chinese-speaking culture, for
example, somatic and emotion words are less differentiated (i.e.,
bodily words are oftentimes embedded in other words—Tung,
1994).
Work by Tsai et al. (2004) addresses this question of mechanism
by dissociating cultural conceptions from language. In comparing
European–Americans, less-acculturated Chinese–Americans, and
more-acculturated Chinese–Americans speaking the same lan-
guage (i.e., English), they were able to directly contrast the effects
of cultural beliefswhile holding language constant. If differences in
somatic focus between members of Eastern and Western cultures
were the product of language differences, then their experimental
design would have yielded no differences between the three cul-
tural groups given that all spoke the same (English) language. If
somatic focus differences were the product of culturally speciﬁc
conceptions about the psychological meaning afforded to bodily
processes, then differences between the three groupswould appear,
despite the use of shared language. Their ﬁndings provide sup-
port for the latter model, as less-acculturated Chinese–Americans
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displayed more somatic word use relative to more acculturated
Chinese–Americans and European–Americans.
Similar arguments have been made to explain West-Africans’
greater somatic awareness. Chentsova-Dutton and Dzokoto
(2014) argued that top–down factors like cultural schemata sur-
rounding the role of the body, their accompanying culturally
speciﬁc terms (e.g., “seselelame”), and their use of emotional
expressions that integrate body parts (e.g., fear as “heart-ﬂy”) can
explain West-African’s self-reported sensitivity to bodily cues.
In contrast to this focus on cultural conceptions of the body
used to explain cross-cultural variation in somatic focus, a differ-
ent set of mechanisms have been used to explain differences in
interoceptive accuracy. Given that cultural differences in these two
processes diverge (i.e., with non-Westerners being more likely to
display the former but less likely to display the latter), it is not sur-
prising that attempts to explain East-Asians and West-Africans’
relative inaccuracy in interoceptive perception have focused not
on cultural models of the body, but a different set of processes that
are more cognitive in nature.
Attempts to explain cultural variation in interoceptive accu-
racy between East-Asians and European–Americans have focused
on analyses of East–West epistemologies, and have suggested that
despite the heightened focus on bodily processes, cultural dif-
ferences in cognitive styles may nevertheless render those from
Eastern cultures less able to accurately attend to internal cues.
Speciﬁcally, Ma-Kellams et al. (2012) proposed that Asians and
European–Americans differ in interoceptive abilities due to dif-
ferences in context dependency. Past research on culture and
cognition has consistently demonstrated that Easterners attend
more to contextual cues when evaluating both the self (e.g., Kana-
gawa et al., 2001) and others and external events (e.g., Morris
and Peng, 1994). Furthermore, such an attentional difference
appears to be more than a matter of voluntary control: even
when asked to ignore contextual cues, Asians exhibit greater dif-
ﬁculty (compared with European–Americans) on such tasks (Ji
et al., 2000; Masuda and Nisbett, 2001; Kitayama and Ishii, 2002;
Ishii et al., 2003; Kitayama et al., 2003). This focus on contextual
cues should render Asians less attentive to their internal states
(relative to the external cues stemming from the external world)
because if the individual self is not the central object of focus
or primary unit of analysis compared to the surrounding con-
text, then bodily changes should be relatively less attended to. In
other words, Asians tend to disproportionately focus on exter-
nal contextual entities outside of themselves—both in terms of
other individuals (as part of the interdependent self—Markus and
Kitayama, 1991) as well as other factors in their environment
(e.g., ﬁeld-dependence—Ji et al., 2000)—and yet accurate inte-
roception requires one to ignore such external factors in order
to focus on one’s internal state. Thus, the argument is that
contextual dependency explains East Asians’ lower interoceptive
accuracy. Consistent with this argument, Ma-Kellams et al. (2012)
found that individual differences in the ability to ignore contex-
tual cues mediated performance differences between Easterners
and Westerners on an interoceptive task—in this case, heartbeat
detection.
In the West-African cultural context, Chentsova-Dutton and
Dzokoto (2014) proposed that the higher levels of somatic
awareness reported by members of this cultural group may be the
precisemechanisms that hinders their interoceptive accuracy. That
is, West-African culture holds a particular schema that links fear
with a racing heart. Although this schema may accurately portray
the link between emotion and physiological change in general, it
may not serve to accurately describe online (i.e., in-the-moment)
bodily changes. Thus, in the context of their study, in which they
had West-Africans estimate their own heart rates while watching
a fear-inducing ﬁlm, it might have been possible that the saliency
of the emotional content led these participants to expect increases
in heart rate (in line with the schema) but ignore the actual, more
subtle cues from their body. Thus, another possible explanation
for cultural differences in interoceptive accuracy is that cultures
that exhibit high levels of somatic focus may ironically be worse
at detecting actual somatic change because highly salient somatic
schema are chronically accessible and renders individuals less likely
to attend to actual somatic cues.
PART 3: CULTURAL PRACTICES AND INTEROCEPTION
Culture is not known of its timeless, unchanging nature; if any-
thing, culture changes as social life changes, and a fundamental
component of culture is the practices, rituals, and traditions indi-
viduals of any given cultural group rely on that promotes culturally
consistent ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving. Thus, this
section focuses on the behavioral and contemplative practices
from different cultural origins that have been proposed as pos-
sible “interventions,” or methods of cultivating bodily awareness
and perceptual accuracy.
Meditation, mindfulness, and yoga are ancient Eastern prac-
tices, but in recent years they have received increasing empirical
attention in the context of psychological well-being and health. At
the core, yoga and its related practices takes a holistic approach
to the mind and body, assuming that exercises with a mental
focus will have bodily effects, and bodily exercises will have men-
tal effects. Together, they share a variety of common features,
including prolonged physical stillness and/or some kind of men-
tal control characterized by stability and focus, a perceptual style
in which there is little active effort to interpret sensory informa-
tion. From a scientiﬁc standpoint, they have conceptualized these
practices as a complex set of emotional and attentional training
regimens (Lutz et al., 2007). Although these techniques are tra-
ditionally used in spiritual contexts, there is a growing trend in
using them as a form of alternative therapy (Astin et al., 2003;
Barnes et al., 2004; Arias et al., 2006).
Meditation, yoga, and mindfulness techniques typically incor-
porate somatic awareness and use the body as an object of focus
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Selby, 1992; Kornﬁeld, 1996; Nairn, 2000).
It is important to note that in this context, somatic awareness
is deﬁned primarily by adaptively focusing direct attention on
in-the-moment bodily changes (Flor et al., 2001; Watkins and
Moulds, 2005) rather than engaging in emotionally driven vig-
ilance (Ciofﬁ, 1991; Ciofﬁ and Holloway, 1993; Watkins and
Moulds, 2005).
Beyond focusing on the body, bodily sensations are also mod-
ulated through breathing and posture (Bhajan and Khalsa, 2000;
Arambula et al., 2001; Peng et al., 2004). Theorists have posited
that thebeneﬁts observed frompracticing anyor all of these actions
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are derived from these common elements (for review, see Watts,
2000), and followers of these practices attest that engaging in this
kind of intentional attunement leads to improved awareness of a
variety of internal states, including bodily awareness (Kabat-Zinn,
1990; Kornﬁeld, 1996; Nairn, 2000).
Khalsa et al. (2008) empirically tested this assertion by exam-
ining interoceptive accuracy among two groups of experienced
meditators, TibetanBuddhists andKundalinimonks, and compar-
ing them to a group of non-meditators. The authors assessed both
self-perceived interoceptive awareness (i.e., participants’ reports
of their interoceptive performance) and actual interoceptive accu-
racy (i.e., on a heartbeat detection task). Contrary to prediction,
experienced meditators displayed comparable levels of accuracy
relative to non-meditators, but self-reported higher levels of inte-
roceptive awareness. Similar ﬁndings have also been reported by
Nielsen and Kaszniak (2006), albeit with a smaller sample size
and no control group. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that
contrary to lay assumptions, chronic engagement in meditative
practices only appears to heighten somatic awareness but does not
appear to improve actual interoceptive accuracy.
Despite the lack of evidence for a direct link between medita-
tive practices and interoceptive accuracy, these practices are not
without other physiological and psychological beneﬁts. Empiri-
cal studies comparing yoga with relaxation exercises, for example,
have found that both practices yielded similar physical andpsycho-
logical beneﬁts (e.g., decreases in heart rate and blood pressure,
increases in self-esteem—Jaggi, 1979; Cusumano and Robinson,
1992). Other studies have found additional physiological ben-
eﬁts of yoga, including asthma and hyperventilation (Chandra,
1994) and hypertension (Steptoe, 1981). Similar arguments have
been made about mindfulness techniques, which have been shown
to prevent depressive rumination (e.g., Teasdale et al., 1995).
Recently, Shannahoff-Khalsa proposed that combining medita-
tion with breathing and somatic exercises based on the Hindu
Tantric practice of Kundalini Yoga can be used as an interven-
tion for a wide range of psychiatric disorders. Thus, a review
of the empirical studies on meditation, mindfulness, and yoga
reveals mixed evidence for the effects of such contemplative
practices on bodily awareness and interoceptive accuracy—these
meditative practices appear to facilitate the former, but not the
latter; these limitations notwithstanding, they may offer physi-
ological and psychological beneﬁts in other contexts apart from
interoception.
PART 4: CULTURE, INTEROCEPTION, AND
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
A substantive body of work demonstrates that members of dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds exhibit differential levels of somatic
symptoms in response to both physical and mental illness. In the
context of physical illness, African–Americans are more likely to
report bodily symptoms after exercise, surgery, and in response
to a variety of diseases (Faucett et al., 1994; Shefﬁeld et al., 1999;
Edwards et al., 2001). In the context of psychological distress,
members of non-Western cultures are more likely to report bod-
ily symptoms rather than purely affective ones; this pattern has
been demonstrated with African (Chowdhury, 1996; Dzokoto
and Adams, 2005); African–American (Friedman and Paradis,
2002); Cambodian (Hinton et al., 2006, 2007); and Chinese sam-
ples (Park and Hinton, 2002; Ryder et al., 2008; Ryder and
Chentsova-Dutton, 2012).
The heightened rates of somatization of psychological distress
in Asian culture is perhaps the most widely studied example of
cultural variation in the cultural psychopathology literature (see
Ryder et al., 2002). Compared to individuals of European descent,
those from Asian countries are allegedly more likely to manifest
bodily symptomswhen experiencing psychological distress. In one
of the initial studies on culture and epidemiology, Kleinman and
Good (1985) found that depression was rarely reported in Chi-
nese cultures, but neurasthenia—a similar illness characterized by
somatic symptoms—was much more prevalent; he subsequently
concluded the neurasthenia emerged as a culturally speciﬁc man-
ifestation of depression. Subsequent studies have similarly found
a greater tendency among Chinese to report somatic symptoms
(Tsoi, 1985; Chan, 1990; Simon et al., 1999; Yen et al., 2000; Parker
et al., 2001). In the attempt to explain these cultural differences,
numerous theoretical arguments have been put forth, including
linguistic features of the Chinese language (e.g., Leff, 1981); stigma
associated with psychiatric conditions (e.g., Goffman, 1963), and
differences in emotional expression norms (Sayar et al., 2003).
More recent research has challenged both theoretically and
empirically. Theoretically speaking, Cheung (1995) posited that
most of the explanations put forth for cultural variation in soma-
tization were formed on a post hoc basis rather than built as part
of the study designs. Empirically, Ryder et al. (2008) contended
that many of the existing studies that have found cultural differ-
ences in somatic symptom reporting lacked aWestern comparison
sample and thus could not rule out the alternative explanation
that somatic symptoms is a general feature of depression; fur-
thermore, most studies relied on a single assessment mode, thus
leaving the inﬂuence of modality on the ﬁnding an open question.
Thus, in their study, Ryder et al. (2008) used three different assess-
ment modalities (self-report, clinical interview, questionnaire)
to assess symptom presentation among Chinese and European–
Canadians; they found that although Chinese patients reported
more somatic symptoms than European–Canadians, European–
Canadians reported more psychological symptoms, and the latter
effects was larger and more consistent than the former. The
authors concluded that in the context of depression, cultural dif-
ferences may center more on Western “psychologization” rather
than Eastern somatization.
Zaroff et al. (2012) also challenged the long-standing view of
somatization as a culture-speciﬁc pathology in their review of the
literature, which found that rates of somatic symptom report-
ing are comparable across cultures when ascertainment methods
are controlled for. They suggest that cultural variation in stigma
associated with psychological illness and service provision, along
with cultural socialization patterns, can explain what appears to be
cultural differences in symptom reporting; however, when assess-
ment techniques include direct questioning of mood and consider
response patterns on self-report, much of the aforementioned
cultural differences are attenuated.
Beyond depression, limited work has examined cultural differ-
ences in somatization with other psychopathologies. For example,
Viernes et al. (2007) examined the link between somatization of
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distress, food restriction and fat phobia among Filipino and West-
ern teenagers. They found that Western teenagers displayed more
food restriction practices and fat phobia, and lower levels of
somatization of distress. Fear of fatness was correlated with soma-
tization, and the authors raised the question of whether fat phobia
and somatization stand as culturally speciﬁc forms of expressing
psychological distress (see also Helman, 1990). Nevertheless, it
remained unclear based on their data whether such a link was
causal or epiphenomenal. However, given that past studies have
reliably shown interoceptive accuracy to relate to food deprivation
(Herbert et al., 2011, 2012a), obesity (Herbert and Pollatos, 2014)
and disordered eating (Koch and Pollatos, 2014b), it is likely that
cultural differences in accuracy may also lead to related differences
in food and eating disorders.
Likewise, somatization has been linked to other disorders in
cultural contexts, including a variety of anxiety-based disorders
(e.g., ataque de nervios, or “attack of nerves,” an unexplained
distress syndrome found in parts of Latin-America—Lopez et al.,
2011; Dhat syndrome, a culturally bound preoccupation with
perceived semen loss found in India—Ranjith and Mohan, 2006;
“Ode Ori,” a disorder characterized by a perceived crawling sen-
sation in the body found in Nigeria—Makanjuola, 1987). Beyond
these culture-speciﬁc disorders, somatic symptoms has also been
linked to more generalized reports of anxiety and depression (e.g.,
in Pakistan—Minhas and Nizami, 2006; Israel—Al-Krenawi and
Graham, 2004; Egypt— Abdel-Khalek and Lester, 2009; Mexico—
Varela et al., 2004), as well as speciﬁc reports of post-traumatic
stress and panic disorder (e.g., in Cambodia—Boehnlein, 2001).
Though suggestive, the limited number of studies done on the
role of culture and somatization in these disorders make it dif-
ﬁcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions about how and why somatic
symptoms feature so prominently in a variety of both gener-
alized and culture-speciﬁc anxiety-based and depression-based
disorders. Nevertheless, the prevalence of somatization in non-
Western cultures is largely consistent with the ﬁnding that many
non-Western cultural group members exhibit lower levels of inte-
roceptive accuracy, given that somatization may reﬂect an inability
to accurately perceive one’s bodily states. Indeed, a growing body
of research supports this notion that somatization is a reﬂection
of poor interoceptive abilities (Gardner et al., 1990; Bogaerts et al.,
2008).
CONCLUSION
In summary, a review of the existing literature suggests that cross-
cultural differences in interoception can be summarized as follows:
(1) members of non-Western cultures tend to exhibit higher levels
of somatic awareness but lower levels of interoceptive accuracy; (2)
variation in cultural conceptualizations and epistemic traditions
can, in part, explain these differences, (3) cultural practices related
to meditation, yoga, and mindfulness, in line with the aforemen-
tioned evidence, appear to facilitate bodily awareness but fail to
improve actual accuracy, and (4) the heightened somatic aware-
ness among non-Western cultures is linked to a greater emphasis
on somatic symptoms in awide array of psychopathologies—most
notably, depression and anxiety.
These ﬁndings notwithstanding, there remains several areas
that warrant further research in the context of culture and
interoception. First and most broadly, the overwhelming majority
of research in culture and interoception in particular and cul-
tural psychology in general has been focused on the East–West
comparison. Although this reliance on comparing members of
East–Asian andEuropean–American cultures has been fruitful and
telling, there remains a substantive gap in our knowledge about
how Western models of embodiment and related psychological
processes emerge—or fail to emerge—in other cultural contexts.
A small but growing body of work has begun to tackle this ques-
tion in West Africa and Latin-America, but there remains much to
be explored in other cultural contexts.
A related need is greater precision in deﬁning the nature of
observed cross-cultural differences. Few studies, if any, have
attempted to take a multidimensional view of somatic aware-
ness when assessing for cross-cultural differences. However, given
recent developments in our understanding of the complex nature
of body awareness (Mehling et al., 2012), future research can
more systematically use multidimensional measures of somatic
awareness (e.g., the MAIA—Mehling et al., 2012) in cross-cultural
contexts. Similarly, more work is needed to assess the robustness
of cross-cultural differences in interoceptive accuracy given the
relative paucity of empirical studies to date that have investigated
this construct.
Second, little is known about the role of somatic awareness
and interoceptive accuracy in cross-cultural, psychopathological
contexts apart from those relating to depression and/or anxiety.
An example of one pathology that warrants further research is the
role of culture and interoception in eating disorders. Although
there is some initial evidence that interoception is a key process in
anorexia nervosa (e.g.,Arnold, 2012) and rates of anorexia nervosa
varies across cultures (e.g., see Simpson, 2002, for review), few
studies, if any, have examined whether interoceptive differences
can explain cultural variation in this disorder. The case of anorexia
nervosa serves as just one example of a psychopathology that may
be moderated by culture and interoception, but for which there is
limited research.
Third, more research is needed to elucidate how and when
culture-speciﬁc practices—including, but not limited to mindful-
ness, meditation, and yoga—can assist in or hinder interoceptive
accuracy. Despite the fact that existing empirical studies have
failed to ﬁnd a reliable relationship between experienced medi-
tators and interoceptive accuracy, various alternative explanations
remain. Subsequent studies can aim to manipulate the practice
of meditation rather than rely on a self-selected sample of exist-
ing meditators to more directly assess the causal link between
meditation and interoceptive accuracy. Furthermore, additional
studies can assess interoceptive abilities in a wider array of forms
(e.g., in modalities other than heartbeat detection) and bodily
states (e.g., in states other than resting state). Doing so can help
further elucidate the precise mechanisms and boundary condi-
tions underlying the relationship between cultural practices and
interoception.
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